What a difference an “and” makes.
The US-China Strategic Economic Dialogue (SED), a twice-yearly bilateral encounter centred on economic issues, has morphed under President Barack Obama into the broader Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED).
For those with a grammatical bent, the addition of a conjunction transforms the word “strategic” from an adjective describing the economic dialogue into a portmanteau adjective describing anything Hillary Clinton damn well wants.
The upshot of US inter-agency rivalry is that Mrs Clinton’s state department joins Tim Geithner’s Treasury at the heart of the conversation with Beijing.
The upshot of US inter-agency rivalry is that Mrs Clinton’s state department joins Tim Geithner’s Treasury at the heart of the conversation with Beijing.
That is no bad thing.
It has broadened the agenda from what Hank Paulson, Mr Geithner’s predecessor, originally conceived in 2006 as a narrowly economic forum.
Now that the state department has muscled in, climate change, North Korea and any other issue of global or bilateral import have joined US deficits, financial sector reform and the renminbi as potential subjects for discussion.
Widening the agenda of talks, the latest round of which wrapped up in Washington on Tuesday, makes sense.
Widening the agenda of talks, the latest round of which wrapped up in Washington on Tuesday, makes sense.
The Sino-US relationship is evolving fast. Mr Obama’s China policy builds on foundations laid by his predecessor. For a president who promised change, one area of constancy with George W. Bush’s White House has been the posture towards Beijing. That was one of the few things his predecessor was judged to have got about right.
Unlike Mr Bush, or Bill Clinton before him, President Obama has not had to backpedal from initial hostility towards China towards a more accommodating stance.
In part this is because of his conviction that it is good to reach out. If he can talk to Tehran or Pyongyang, he can certainly entertain friendly dialogue with Beijing.
It is also because he had little choice.
The economic crisis has tilted the balance of power towards China. The US is feeling less confident about its economic underpinnings and less able than before to lecture Beijing on revaluation or the delights of liberalisation, particularly since so many of its own banks, insurers and carmakers have fallen under state control.
If anything, it is Beijing – some of whose officials now privately boast they have nothing at all to learn from the Great Spendthrift – that has the upper hand.
If anything, it is Beijing – some of whose officials now privately boast they have nothing at all to learn from the Great Spendthrift – that has the upper hand.
China’s seeming financial hold over the US has been brought into sharp relief. Beijing has become prone to lecture Washington on the need to safeguard its $2,000bn reserves, the bulk of which are parked in US dollars.
It is wholly appropriate that Washington accords due attention to China, the most important emerging power since America itself.
It is wholly appropriate that Washington accords due attention to China, the most important emerging power since America itself.
But there is also a danger of taking China too seriously. In compensating for past neglect, things could swing too far the other way. For all the euphoria about the G2 – the Sino-US axis that, according to some breathless reckoning, is the only meaningful global forum – it is worth pausing to survey the facts.
For a start, China’s financial grip over the US is not as tight as many suggest.
For a start, China’s financial grip over the US is not as tight as many suggest.
Far from a sign of strength, Beijing’s accumulation of vast foreign reserves is the side-effect of an economic model too reliant on exports. The enormous trade surplus is the product of an undervalued renminbi that has allowed others to consume Chinese goods at the expense of Chinese people themselves.
Beijing cannot dream of selling down its Treasury holdings without triggering the very dollar collapse it purports to dread. Nor are its shrill calls for the US to close its twin deficits – which would inevitably involve buying fewer Chinese goods – entirely convincing.
Beijing cannot dream of selling down its Treasury holdings without triggering the very dollar collapse it purports to dread. Nor are its shrill calls for the US to close its twin deficits – which would inevitably involve buying fewer Chinese goods – entirely convincing.
Rather than exposing the superiority of China’s state-led model, the global financial crisis has laid bare the compromising embrace in which the US and China find themselves.
Commentators also sometimes confuse China’s rapid progress and likely emergence as a superpower with present-day reality.
Commentators also sometimes confuse China’s rapid progress and likely emergence as a superpower with present-day reality.
China is still a relatively poor country. For all its military ambitions, it is decades away from being a match for the US.
In 2005, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, China accounted for just 4 per cent of global military spending, a tad short of the UK and France, and an aircraft-carrier-length away from the US, at 46 per cent.
True, US might has been humbled in Iraq and Afghanistan. But China has not even tried to project its power on nations such as North Korea, which has tiptoed towards nuclear status under its very nose.
China is more fragile than its increasingly strident tone suggests. Its economy has been kept churning by enforced bank lending that could yet rebound in asset price bubbles or a crop of bad loans.
Communist party control is strong but brittle. Given the choice between projecting China’s authority on the world stage at this month’s G8 summit in Italy or tackling brewing ethnic conflict in Xinjiang, Hu Jintao, China’s president, chose to rush home.
None of this suggests that the US is wrong to engage China at the highest and deepest of levels. China’s emergence as a great power demands no less.
None of this suggests that the US is wrong to engage China at the highest and deepest of levels. China’s emergence as a great power demands no less.
Yet the US, quiet on human rights and muted on the renminbi, may be underselling itself. China will be a huge force to be reckoned with. But it is not quite there yet.








