Thursday, June 30, 2011

Room to Live and Love in China's Cities

By DIDI KIRSTEN TATLOW

Patrons during a show at a recently opened lesbian club in the center of Beijing.
BEIJING — Shortly after they met, Wu Zheng shocked her girlfriend, Charlene Lee, by kissing her on a Beijing street.
“I said, ‘What, you do that here?’ I’m from Singapore, and we’re conservative. There is that constant fear,” recalled Ms. Lee, 30.
“I felt it was no problem,” said Ms. Wu, 30, a native Beijinger, grinning at Ms. Lee as she stirred a bloody mary in a cafe.
It wasn’t.
Lesbians in China today are remarkably free, the result of profound social changes over three decades of fast economic growth, and of being female in a society that values men far above women. Invisibility provides lesbians with room to live and love amid the anonymity of China’s millions-strong megacities.
“I think people are more tolerant of female gays than male gays,” said Li Yinhe, a sociologist at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences.
“China is a very patriarchal society, so people feel if a man is gay that’s really shameful.”
“Traditional society basically overlooks women in some ways, and there is a certain freedom in that,” she said.
“But that free space isn’t necessarily power.”
Lesbians’ freedom exists in a gray area.
Like male homosexuals, lesbian couples cannot marry or legally form a family, creating problems in separation, illness or inheritance issues.
Confronted too openly, relatives often object, too.
“Chinese people can accept people being lesbian or gay. But not within their own family,” Ms. Wu said, who is an events manager and plans to start an online sex toy business.
“In China it’s very weird,” Ming Ming, a lesbian documentary filmmaker, said.
“If you don’t talk about it, it doesn’t exist. But actually it’s not at all easy. The pressure to marry is enormous.”
Traditionally, men are expected to carry on the family line, creating greater pressure on male gays to marry. In theory, that offers lesbians greater freedom.
But in practice, “It’s a huge loss of face for a family when a daughter doesn’t marry,” said Ms. Ming.
Also, China’s one-child policy has produced around 140 million only children, Ji Baocheng, president of Renmin University of China, told the official People’s Daily newspaper in March.
This has increased pressure on lesbian only daughters to produce offspring.
Lesbianism was officially taboo until 1997, when “hooliganism,” a catchall term that included homosexuality, was struck off the criminal code.
The Communists’ narrow morality in the decades after the 1949 revolution contrasted with the preceding Republican period and the end of the last imperial dynasty, when women refusing marriage — many of them lesbians — gathered in villages in southern Guangdong Province to “comb their own hair,” as noted recently in People’s Daily.
The phrase refers to the traditional practice of women tying their hair in a bun when they marry.
Today, most major cities in China have lesbian bars or cafes offering support groups, talks and parties.
In Beijing and Shanghai there are gay pride events, held privately in the hope of avoiding cancellation by the authorities (as happened this month with the biennial Beijing Queer Film Festival. The festival went ahead anyway, “guerrilla-style,” organizers said.)
State media discuss lesbianism and commitment ceremonies, and the official Legal Daily newspaper even reported on a survey showing that about half of lesbians had experienced violence from relatives or partners.
Campaigners for gay marriage say they are gaining ground, though very slowly.
In terms of personal behavior, “The change is coming faster and faster,” said An Ke, organizer of Lala Salon, a weekly lecture and discussion at Half Dozen, a bar in Beijing.
Speaking after a recent salon — on rape in eastern Congo — Ms. An said lesbians are, cautiously, “coming out.”
“There are 70-year-olds, 50-year-olds who have come out. Seven years ago that wasn’t happening,” she said.
“The age of women coming out is also getting younger and younger.”
In the Beijing suburb of Tongzhou, Ms. Ming and her partner, Shi Tou, have been making a documentary film about more than 100 Chinese lesbians for seven years.
Due out in 2012, they plan to show “Sweet Desert” at international film festivals and wherever they can domestically.
Lesbian-themed films can be shown, discreetly, in bars and universities, said Ms. Shi, 42, who acted in China’s first feature film about lesbians, “Fish and Elephant,” screened in 2001 at the Venice Film Festival.
Lesbian government and Communist Party officials refused to be filmed.
Being openly gay in government is a career killer, Ms. Shi said.
“There is so little about lalas in China,” Ms. Shi said, using the slang term by which Chinese lesbians refer to themselves.
Debate about homosexuality is focused on men, and on issues like H.I.V., she said.
Still, said Ms. Wu: “I think it’s really very free here. People close one eye — as long as you don’t demand too many human rights.”
Yet interest in rights is growing.
“Of course, we want more recognition,” said Ms. An, the salon organizer.
An 18-year-old at the salon, who gave her name as Vagas, agreed.
Previously she thought gay marriage “wasn’t that important, but now I think we need it, and not just for me, for everyone. We need the protection.”
Ms. Li, the sociologist, has campaigned for same-sex marriage since 2002, repeatedly proposing it for discussion at the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, an advisory body to the government.
“It has to come sooner or later,” she said.
An online survey in March by the NetEase portal lady.163.com suggested that about one in four Chinese may support same-sex marriage, with 455,231 for and 1,549,488 against.
While the survey of self-selected respondents may not offer an especially scientific view, Ms. Li said it mirrored her own findings — that a substantial minority could accept some form of legalized gay union.
The law is an impediment, but so are family attitudes, most conservative in the countryside.
Wu Zi, 34, a member of the Muslim Hui ethnicity from the far western region of Xinjiang, is small but stocky, useful, she says, for lifting extra-large iron woks in her job as chef at the Renjia Army Corps restaurant.
Born in a small village about 60 kilometers, or 40 miles, northeast of Urumqi, the regional capital, Ms. Wu is one of eight children. She left home at 17.
“I realized I’d have to get married if I stayed,” she said, shortly after beginning work at a branch of the restaurant in Beijing.
In Urumqi, she lived with a woman for eight years before her partner succumbed to family pressure and married a man.
The unhappy marriage lasted two years.
Her former partner divorced, then remarried.
Ms. Wu’s mother knows she is a lesbian, but her father, who died, never learned.
“Our life was very difficult. My parents had to do a lot of hard farm work,” raising cows and goats, she said. “I could never hurt them.”
“They were pressuring me to marry. So one year I came home and told my mother: ‘O.K., I’ll marry — a woman’.”
Her mother took it well.
“Perhaps because she has seven other children,” Ms. Wu said.
Many lesbians marry, she said. “About 80 percent. And then they all have affairs with each other. The lesbian scene is very chaotic.”
Like Ms. Wu, Xue Lian, 35, from rural Hubei Province in the southwest, doesn’t want to deceive anyone.
She lives with her 65-year-old father in a small village 40 minutes’ drive west of Lichuan, a town of 70,000 in steep, green hills, near the Yangtze River.
“I don’t know a single woman around here who is 30 and unmarried,” Ms. Xue said.
“I’m nearly 40 and not married. It’s a huge topic of discussion.
“I don’t actually know a single other lesbian in Lichuan. I guess they all suppress it and marry. I couldn’t do that. For me, it would be like rape.”
Outgoing and charismatic, Ms. Xue has traveled the country doing odd jobs for over 15 years, the only way to find love, she said.
She has sold fruit in markets, worked in a glass bottle factory and for an auto parts company. She has had four meaningful affairs.
When she was in her 20s, she considered having a sex-change operation, “so I would be free to have a girlfriend here at home.”
She now thinks she won’t.
She learned from the Internet that she could be a lesbian and keep her body as it is, she said.
Her moment of revelation came while surfing the Internet in the summer of 2006.
“I read about lesbians in Nanjing, who used to gather near a bridge,” she recounted.
With that, “I felt I had found a name for myself.”
That summer she set up a blog, named Peripheral Person.
Her last entry was in December 2010.
“I don’t really like going online,” she said.
She said she doesn’t want to leave her father — three siblings have married and moved away, and her mother is dead — but said, “Either my father will be unhappy, or I will be unhappy.”
At a recent lunch in her dim, earth-floored home, her father told a visitor: “She’s a good daughter. But disobedient. She doesn’t marry.”
Afterwards, in tears, Ms. Xue said: “I don’t think I’m a selfish person. But love is selfish.”
Ideally, Ms. Xue would like to join Beijing’s large and growing community.
For now, she waits at home, seeking solace in calligraphy.
“My father often talks about who will look after me if I don’t marry, when he is gone, if I get sick,” she said. “It makes me feel so bad to make him worry. But then I do calligraphy for a day and I feel better.”
For Ms. Lee, the Singaporean, “Beijing is my escape.”
Ms. Wu agreed. “They say, the farther from your family, the better. And it’s true.”
For the Beijing native, this city of 20 million is large enough to make it unlikely her family would ever hear about her sexual orientation.
Yet she wants to return to Shanghai, where she lived before.
It’s even more open, she said.
“When I lived there, I was totally ‘out.’ Here, I’m not.”

Google+ 'blocked in China'

Great Firewall of China website shows users are unable to access any location within google.com
By Charles Arthur

Great Firewall of China shows that Google+ is blocked in China
Google's new social network service, Google+, has apparently been blocked in China within a day of being launched.
The company also halted new signups after a torrid first 24 hours in which "insane" demand to join it forced the company to close it to new members briefly.
According to the site Great Firewall of China, which uses a server based in China to try to access external web locations, Google users inside China are unable to access any location within google.com, which includes the URL for Google+, at plus.google.com.
Another access-checking service, Just Ping, also reports that the plus.google.com URL is inaccessible within China.
The blocking by the Chinese government, using its "great firewall" – a censorship system which blocks a huge number of websites outside the Chinese borders on the basis that they contain "destabilising" content such as pornography or unsuitable views – matches that applied to other western social networks, including Facebook and Twitter.
Google's main URL, google.com, has been blocked inside China since the company decided to withdraw from the mainland in 2010 in protest at what it saw as government-inspired hacking.
According to the Great Firewall site, its Chinese version, google.cn, is also blocked while that of China-sanctioned Baidu is not.
Google+ is being seen as Google's answer to Facebook, which boasts almost 700m users – although it is effectively banned inside China, where only people who use encrypted connections to the outside world are able to join it.
Vic Gundotra, one of the company's top engineers who watched the development closely, posted on Google+ early on Thursday morning (at roughly 8.45pm on Wednesday night in Google's Pacific timezone) that "we've shut down the invite mechanism for the night. Insane demand. We need to do this carefully, and in a controlled way. Thank you for all of your interest!"
Invites were opened up again on Thursday afternoon, though only on a limited basis.
There are no details yet on how many people have joined the service.
China's government on Friday celebrates an important anniversary, of 90 years since the founding of the Communist party of China, and it has instituted a number of crackdowns on internet use and heightened censorship.
Earlier this week Google revealed that it receives a steady stream of requests for private data from developed countries — but that it had had no content removal requests from the Chinese government in the second half of 2010.
However it received 90 requests from China-controlled Hong Kong for user data, an increase of 80% from the same period in 2009; it acquiesced to 53 of them, a 59% compliance rate.

UN Criticizes China's Failure to Arrest Sudan's Bashir

VOA News

Chinese President Hu Jintao, right, shakes hands with Sudan's President Omar al-Bashir during the signing ceremony at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing, June 29, 2011.
The United Nations has criticized China for failing to arrest Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir during his visit to Beijing this week.
U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights Navi Pillay said Thursday she is "disappointed" China welcomed Bashir, who is wanted by the International Criminal Court.
The ICC has charged Bashir with war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide in Sudan's Darfur region.
Pillay said Thursday that even though China is not an ICC member, Beijing still has a responsibility to ensure the African leader is brought to trial.
China's foreign ministry said this week that it reserves judgement on the ICC's prosecution of Bashir.
The United Nations says fighting in Darfur has killed some 300,000 people and displaced 2.7 million since 2003.
President Bashir and Chinese President Hu Jintao signed loan and economic cooperation agreements in Beijing on Wednesday.
China is a key arms supplier to Sudan and its biggest purchaser of oil.

China opens world's longest sea bridge

China has opened the world’s longest sea bridge, a 26.4 mile-long structure that could easily span the English Channel.
By Malcolm Moore, Shanghai

A bridge too far? China has opened the world's longest sea crossing. The eight-lane, 35-metre-wide structure cost £1.4bn.
Stretching across the wide blue waters of Jiaozhou bay, the vast Y-shaped bridge connects the booming Northern port city of Qingdao with an airport built on a nearby island and the industrial suburb of Huangdao.
The first motorists to roll onto the bridge’s six-lane, 110ft-wide, highway halved their journey time to the other side of the bay to just 30 minutes.
While the bridge will eventually charge cars 50 yuan (£4.80) for the crossing, for a month the drive will be free.
While traffic on the bridge was sparse on its opening, city officials predicted that 30,000 cars a day would eventually cross it each day.
“It is a magnificent and very advanced bridge,” said Li Qun, the local Communist party secretary, at the opening ceremony.
“It is another stepping stone in the city’s smooth and rapid development”.
Built in just four years at a cost reported by the Chinese state media yesterday as £1.42 billion the bridge stands on 5,200 pillars and was entirely designed by Chinese engineers at the Shandong Gausu Group.
“We have learned a lot of new techniques and skills during the construction,” said Shao Xinpeng, the bridge’s chief engineer.
At least 10,000 workers toiled in two teams around the clock to build the bridge, working from opposite sides of the bay and linking the two ends together in the middle.
“That was a totally original design,” claimed Mr Shao.
While they were working on the bridge, more engineers were simultaneously building an accompanying tunnel underneath the bay, which will help to ease the traffic flow.
A staggering 450,000 tons of steel was used in the construction, enough for almost 65 Eiffel Towers, and 2.3 million cubic metres of concrete.
Chinese officials said that the bridge will be strong enough to withstand a magnitude 8 earthquake, typhoons or the impact of a 300,000 ton ship.
The bridge has eclipsed the current Guinness World Record-holder, the Lake Pontchartrain Causeway in Louisiana, by at least two-and-a-half miles.
However, it will be eclipsed in 2016 by another Chinese bridge, which is being built to link Hong Kong with Macau and Guangdong province and which will be around 30 miles long.
China also boasts a 102-mile-long land bridge on the route of the Beijing to Shanghai high-speed railway.

The world’s longest sea bridge, Qingdao Haiwan Bridge, deconstructed:
Length: 26.4 miles (almost 3 miles longer than the previous record holder)
Width: Six-lane expressway
Capacity: Expected to carry over 30,000 cars a day
Tensile strength: Able to withstand earthquakes of 8.0 magnitudes on the Richter scale, strong typhoons and the impact of a 300,000 tonne vessel
Made up of: 450,000 tonnes of steel and 2.3 million cubic metres of concrete, supported by 5,200 columns
Built by: More than 10,000 workers
Built in: Four years
Importance: Reduces the distance between Quingdao city and the Huangdao district by around 18 miles

Rights lawyers in China harassed, tortured: Amnesty



BEIJING (Reuters) -- Human rights group Amnesty International called on Thursday for China to stop the harassment, arbitrary detention and torture of human rights lawyers, part of what it said was an "uncompromising" series of steps to rein in activists.
The group said Chinese authorities "are not only failing to ensure protection for human rights lawyers and others seeking to provide legal services, but are actively undermining their work through legislative, administrative and practical measures."
"If lawyers and legal workers are rendered incapable of challenging human rights violations committed by those acting in an official capacity, there can be no effective protection of human rights in China," it said in a report.
Amnesty said Chinese authorities must "recognize that lawyers are independent of the state," and "abandon the practice of governing lawyers through state justice bureaus and other administrative departments."
The Chinese government routinely denies mistreating activists, saying everyone is treated equally in accordance with the law, and that nobody is above the law.
Since February, China has mounted a crackdown on potential political challengers to the ruling Communist Party, fearing that anti-authoritarian uprisings in the Arab world could inspire protests against one-party rule.
More than 130 rights activists and human rights lawyers have been detained or "disappeared" without charges, according to Amnesty, noting that out of more than 204,000 lawyers in China, only a few hundred dare tackle human rights cases.
China's loose network of human rights lawyers emerged a decade ago, using a mix of litigation, publicity and lobbying to challenge arbitrary detention, restrictions on speech and other limits on citizens.
For a few years, that "rights defense" campaign scored some successes, and helped defend dissidents and protesters facing trial for challenging Communist Party rule.
The movement now faces pressure as the party pushes back against activism, keen to ensure no challenge to its rule as it prepares for a hand-over of power to a new generation of leaders starting from late next year.
"Of course this has directly influenced citizens' ability to receive help, especially those who the government has deemed dissidents," rights lawyer Shang Baojun told Reuters.
"There are very few lawyers prepared to represent them now. Obviously, this will impact on the progress of democracy and the rule of law in China."
When they do get released, many of these rights lawyers have remained largely silent.
Jiang Tianyong, who was seized in February by security officers and held for two months, told Reuters last week that there were "a few conditions," referring to the terms of his release, including that he not speak to the foreign media.
China's best known rights lawyer, Gao Zhisheng, has been missing since April last year, when he resurfaced briefly after being abducted from his relative's home in Shaanxi province in early February 2009.
Others have been victims of violent attacks, according to rights groups.
Blind legal activist Chen Guangcheng, held under informal house arrest since his release from jail last year, was beaten unconscious and not allowed to visit a doctor, his wife said, according to a U.S. advocacy group.

Billiards in the South China Sea

The U.S. needs to step up and play China's game in territorial disputes.
By MICHAEL AUSLIN

In the South China Sea, China is playing billiards, while America is playing some version of Capture the Flag. For Beijing, the goal is to knock the other billiard balls off the table, leaving itself in control.
Washington, on the other hand, is trying to keep Beijing from capturing the flag of regional hegemony.
American policy makers need to recognize they're playing a different game from the Chinese and adjust their strategy.
While shifting to billiards is too provocative for Washington, if trends continue, it may soon find itself behind the eight ball with few options for maintaining its stabilizing role in the region.
Observers have two different interpretations of what the Chinese challenge actually is.
Many in Washington believe that China threatens freedom of navigation in the South China Sea, thereby potentially harming U.S. national interests, including uncontested passage of U.S. Navy ships, the free flow of global economic trade and maritime lifelines to U.S. allies such as Japan and South Korea.
By contrast, many in Southeast Asia believe that the issue is one of control over territorial resources.
By some estimates, the region holds as much as 30 billion barrels of oil and over 200 trillion cubic feet of natural gas.
While dozens of oil fields are already being explored, it is the ability to control future exploration and exploitation of such resources that is driving China's behavior.
Beijing's claim of the entire South China Sea puts it into a position to contest the ownership of territories that contain proven resources.
The most likely flashpoints are the Spratly and Paracel Islands, each of which is claimed by multiple nations, including China, Vietnam and the Philippines.
This is the same dynamic at play in the dispute between Japan and China over the Senkaku Islands, north of Taiwan.
China's territorial claims can be most effectively exercised by having the capability both to move anywhere in the region's waters (already achieved) as well as to prevent other nations from navigating freely. 
Thus, harassing and shadowing the navies and maritime exploration vessels of other countries serves as a de facto test of Beijing's strength and influence. 
As the surface fleet of its Navy grows, its ability to deploy and cover more territory takes on added meaning with the displays of assertiveness of the past years.
There is little reason to believe that Beijing has any thought (let alone the ability) to seriously hamper regional navigation; such blatantly aggressive moves would be immediately challenged by the U.S. Navy.
Yet, making clear its ability to do so can result in political pressure being put on smaller nations to surrender or modify their territorial claims and to curb their legitimate maritime activities.
This all may not quite amount to a strategy, but it certainly resembles the tactics of the billiard table.
Beijing targets the billiard balls of its neighbors, trying to knock them off the table one by one.
In response, Southeast Asian countries have started clamoring for the U.S. to intervene.
The Philippines last week said that its 1951 defense treaty with the U.S. would cover Chinese threats.
But the U.S. answer isn't so easy.
If Washington pushes too hard and asks Southeast Asian nations to significantly increase joint maritime activities, it will likely find that Hanoi, Manila, Jakarta and the rest fear making China an enemy even more than they fear China acting as a bully.
Too little response by the Americans, however, will convince the smaller nations that they might have no choice but to accede to China's wishes.
In balancing these concerns, Washington has ended up playing a completely different game.
As a status quo power, Washington has largely been reactive to Chinese testing of the limits of regional norms.
Instead of punishing China for its provocations, American policy has tried to reassure Beijing of America's goodwill and convince Chinese leaders that it poses no threat to China's growing influence.
It is hoped this will induce the Chinese to act responsibly, even when tweaked by smaller nations.
The best way forward is to recognize China's game, start playing it and then rig the table.
Washington should seek to expand the billiard table by putting more balls into play. 
India has just announced plans to increase naval patrols in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, which lie at the Indian Ocean entrance to the Malacca Strait.
Japan has made a strategic shift to focus on its "southwestern island wall" stretching from Kyushu to just north of Taiwan.
Australia will be modernizing and doubling its submarine fleet over the next decade.
Then Washington should induce these partners to play a bigger role near disputed waters through greater engagement with Southeast Asian nations.
Further, U.S. and allied ships should shadow Chinese vessels when they start to approach contested territory and move quickly to areas where incidents have occurred.
More broadly, Washington's goal, executed through Hawaii-based Pacific Command, should be to create a more active maritime community of interests in the Indo-Pacific arc and to counter Chinese moves where they occur.
Greater sharing of intelligence resources, joint training, coordinated (if not joint) patrols and the like will provide the measure of security necessary to ensure smaller nations that their international rights are being protected.
U.S. and allied ships should have no compunction about shadowing Chinese naval vessels when they start to approach contested territory.
Finally, political bluntness, such as that of U.S. Senator Jim Webb, who warned of a coming "Munich moment" in Asia, will clarify the issues at stake.
Whether it wants to or not, America will have to start nudging some billiard balls around the table.

Wednesday, June 29, 2011

South China Sea Do-Si-Do

As Chinese threats grow, Asean naturally seeks closer U.S. security ties.
The Wall Street Journal
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Philippine Foreign Affairs Secretary Albert del Rosario
Vietnam and the Philippines continue to express barely bridled anger at Chinese naval vessels and aircraft confronting their own forces and fishing boats in the disputed waters of the South China Sea.
They want more explicit U.S. back-up, and some American politicians want to give it to them.
The U.S. Senate passed a nonbinding resolution Monday deploring the Chinese actions.
But China is hardly backing down.
Last week, Deputy Foreign Minister Cui Tiankai warned that "the individual countries are actually playing with fire, and I hope the fire will not be drawn to the United States."
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton is holding to the line she laid down last July in Hanoi: The U.S. doesn't take sides on the territorial disputes, but it wants to play a role in their peaceful resolution because of its wider interests in the region and its support for freedom of navigation on the high seas.
That was a strong stand at the time.
But as China continues to ratchet up tension it may be time for something stronger.
Philippine Foreign Secretary Albert del Rosario was in Washington last week seeking clarification of the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty between the two countries.
In case of an attack on the Philippines, the wording of that agreement only obligates Washington to "consult" and "act to meet the common dangers."
In the last few days the Philippine media has been chasing its tail trying to figure out whether Mrs. Clinton and U.S. Ambassador to the Philippines Harry Thomas firmed up this U.S. commitment.
The real news is that the Philippines is coming back into the U.S. orbit.
As recently as early this year, Manila seemed to be courting Beijing, for instance, by extraditing Taiwanese citizens to the mainland without consulting Taipei, thereby causing a rift with a major trading partner.
Mr. Aquino's predecessor, Gloria Arroyo, scuttled the efforts of Southeast Asian nations to negotiate as a bloc with China over the South China Sea, instead opting to cut a separate deal in late 2004 to sacrifice some Philippine claims so that joint oil exploration could go ahead.
The current about-face is the result of China overplaying its hand.
Especially alarming is that the People's Liberation Army seems to be calling China's shots on the South China Sea.
China's navy vessels have been involved in confrontations even as its diplomats have been making conciliatory remarks.
While it is too early to say that Beijing is going down the militarist road, it certainly has concentrated minds in Southeast Asian capitals.
The U.S. and its regional friends have two main objectives.
First is to upgrade the 2002 Declaration on Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, which China has routinely violated, to a more rigorous code of conduct that spells out the current status quo and how ships and aircraft must behave to respect it.
Beijing seems to be resuming its policy of "creeping assertiveness" by which it makes the area a Chinese lake by fait accompli.
The second is to convince China to spell out the basis of its claims to the islands and waters surrounding them. Singapore, which has no territorial dispute with China, recently called on Beijing to "clarify its claims with more precision as the current ambiguity as to their extent has caused serious concerns in the international maritime community."
This is important because Beijing has long claimed the South China Sea as its "historical waters" apparently on the basis of a 1947 map showing a dotted U-shaped line around 90% of the area, including the coastal waters of other nations.
Customary law, to which Beijing is signatory through the Law of the Sea treaty, does not recognize such expansive claims.
But the Chinese position can't be subject to rigorous scrutiny until it is stated definitively.
No doubt Beijing would like to avoid that.
Its preference all along has been to negotiate on a bilateral basis with each Southeast Asian neighbor, so that it can bring its superior economic and military heft to bear.
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations had some brief success in getting China to take multilateral negotiations seriously in the early 2000s, until the Philippines bugged out.
Now that Asean is united again, U.S. involvement in the dispute is an important bargaining chip.
Should China continue to preach peace while its forces harass other vessels, Asean nations will be driven to tighten their security arrangements with the U.S.
Some less ambiguous indications from Washington that it will be a willing partner should put Beijing on notice that its civilian leaders need to rein in the military and put the dispute son track for a negotiated solution.

China Supports Global Pariahs, Gets Resources and Criticism in Return

By William Ide | Washington, D.C.

Sudan's President Omar Hassan al-Bashir and China's President Hu Jintao (L) review a military honor guard during a welcoming ceremony at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing, June 29, 2011.
China's global search for resources and energy to fuel its booming economy has taken it places many Western countries are unwilling and unable to go.
China analysts say that by ignoring the behavior of some bad actors, and the pressure of Western sanctions, Beijing has put itself in a unique position to not only seize much needed access to oil, gas and farmland, but strategic advantages and opportunities on the global stage as well.


Out of Africa
China relies on Africa for more than one-third of its petroleum imports.
And without those imports, analysts say, it would have some very serious problems maintaining its current levels of economic growth.
"But it’s an oversimplification to think that China is only interested in natural resources. It’s also interested in its position in the world," says Peter Pham, director of the Michael S. Ansari Africa Center at the Atlantic Council.
"The diplomatic influence that Africa, and its 53 soon to be 54 states, brings to international forums, as well as creating a more multipolar world which advantages China’s national interests more broadly."
Two countries China maintains ties with in Africa that have attracted the attention of the international community and activists are Sudan and Zimbabwe.
Beijing has been a long time ally of Zimbabwe's President Robert Mugabe, who has ruled almost single-handedly for the past three decades.
His administration and ZANU-PF party has been accused of numerous human rights violations.
Zimbabwe has not only given China access to its rich resources of more than 40 different minerals but to land as well to grow crops that can be shipped back to China.
"Zimbabwe has everything from diamonds to tobacco and farm land," says Peter Navarro, an economics professor at the University of California, Irvine.
"China has gone in there and there are a lot of Chinese farmers there now tilling Zimbabwean soil growing crops that are sent back to China while the people of Zimbabwe starve."
China is Zimbabwe's biggest importer of tobacco and China International Water and Electric Company, Pham notes, has lease holds on over a quarter of a million acres of land in southern Zimbabwe for the raising of maize, which it exports back to China.
In turn, China provides Mugabe and his party with political cover in the United Nations Security Council and at the U.N. Human Rights Council.
And it's not just political cover.
China is providing Mugabe's government with "everything from J-8 fighter bomber aircraft have been provided to the Mugabe regime to technical assistance," says Peter Pham.
"Some analysts point the finger at China for providing assistance to tap phones and electronic communications of political dissidents."


Diplomatic dance
However, with such relations, China frequently finds itself facing criticism.
"The Chinese regime does continually put the Chinese people on the wrong side of almost every international conflict in the world, North Korea South Korea, Iran vs it’s neighbors, Pakistan vs. India," says Greg Autry, co-author of the book Death by China and economics professor at University of California Irvine.
"Those are regimes that Beijing understands and the folks in Zhongnanhai are going to be much happier if they can live in a world where other regimes around them think the same way."
Still, in Sudan and Iran, China has found a way to play both sides of the fence and continue to reap the benefits.
In the UN Security Council, China has voted in favor of the last four sanctions against Iran, but blocked attempts to strengthen or expand those trade restrictions.
Peter Navarro says that in the case of Iran, the key is access to that country's natural gas reserves, the second largest in the world.
"China uses its diplomatic veto in the UN to shield Iran sanctions on nuclear proliferation and in exchange they got the deal to get the gas," Navarro says.
In Sudan, China has had to dodge allegations of being an accomplice to the genocide in Darfur and keep from getting dragged into the country's north - south conflict.
That, some analysts note, has forced China to adapt some long-standing approaches to foreign policy.
When criticism of China's support for Khartoum -- advice, weapons and political cover -- peaked during the 2008 Beijing Olympics, which activists dubbed the "Genocide Games," Beijing appointed a special representative for African affairs for the first time.
It has since deployed Chinese peacekeepers as part of the UN African Union hybrid force in Darfur.
"China has also engaged, for several years now, with southern Sudan, reversing a policy of dealing only with national governments," Peter Pham notes.
"Now, part of this is self interest of course, south Sudan holds the majority of petroleum reserves. So part of it is an evolution in China’s interaction with African states and African peoples."


Filling the void
In Asia, China has filled a void in Burma and North Korea that the United States and other countries cannot fill.
In Burma, China is building numerous dams to help feed energy back to its booming coastal cities as well as a pipeline to pump in oil and gas from waters off the Burmese coast and beyond.
“The Chinese are very focused on securing long term energy resources and Burma provides that,” says Ernest Bower, director of the Southeast Asia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
“It’s got enormous natural gas reserves, some oil and then offshore, we don’t actually know yet, what the level of reserve is.”
Marcus Noland, a senior fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics says that while there are a variety of views within China about North Korea, the dominant view in the Chinese government today is that North Korea is a useful pawn.
“North Korea cooperates with Pakistan and Iran among others on missile and nuclear developments and it gives China an opportunity to basically poke its rivals, the United States and India in that geopolitical rivalry, while maintaining plausible deniability about their own actions,” he said.
But allowing Burma and North Korea to continue as sort of isolated bad actors, Bower says, undercuts China’s position in the region.
“And until the Chinese realize that reputational damage they are doing to themselves for their short-term buffer state and energy state and myopic personal interests, or national interests,” he adds.
“I think China will not really have soft power in Asia.”

West queries China over Pakistan atom ties

By Fredrik Dahl
VIENNA -- Western nations pressed China at closed-door nuclear talks to provide more information and help address concerns about its plans to expand an atomic energy plant in Pakistan, diplomatic sources said on Wednesday.
But China showed no sign of reconsidering its position on building two more reactors at the Chashma nuclear power complex in Pakistan's Punjab region, said the sources who attended a June 23-24 meeting of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG).
Beijing's nuclear ties with Islamabad have caused unease in Washington, Delhi and other capitals.
They are worried about Pakistan's history of spreading nuclear arms technology and the integrity of international non-proliferation rules.
Washington and other governments have said China should seek approval for the planned reactors from the NSG, a 46-nation, consensus-based cartel that seeks to ensure nuclear exports do not get used for military purposes.
Beijing is likely to shun such calls, arguing that the construction of two additional units at Chashma would be part of a bilateral deal sealed before it joined the NSG in 2004.
China also supplied the facility's first two reactors.
The United States and European countries made statements at the meeting in the Dutch town of Noordwijk that "both expressed concern and asked the Chinese to provide more information," one diplomat who attended the talks said.
"The Chinese came back and said that as far as they were concerned Chashma 3 and 4 came under the agreement that was grandfathered when they joined in 2004 and that is as far as they feel they need to go," the diplomat added.
The NSG's annual plenary session addressed a range of nuclear-related issues, and agreed to tighten guidelines for the transfer of sensitive enrichment and reprocessing technology that can be used to develop nuclear weapons.
But a statement about the talks did not mention Chashma.
"It is a very sensitive topic," said one European official.


POSSIBLE COMPROMISE?
Another diplomat who declined to be named said: "A number of countries expressed concern and requested more information. There was a brief response from China."
Close relations between China and Pakistan reflect a long-standing shared wariness of their common neighbor, India, and a desire to hedge against U.S. influence across the region.
Chinese nuclear companies have not issued detailed information about when they will start building the new units, but contracts have been signed and financing is being secured.
To receive nuclear exports, nations that are not one of the five officially recognized atomic weapons states must usually place all their nuclear activities under the safeguards of the U.N. International Atomic Energy Agency, NSG rules say.
When the United States sealed a nuclear supply deal with India in 2008 that China and other countries found questionable because Delhi -- like Islamabad -- is outside the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Washington won a waiver from that rule after contentious negotiations.
Pakistan wants a similar civilian nuclear agreement with the United States to help meet its growing energy needs.
But Washington is reluctant, largely because a Pakistani nuclear scientist, Abdul Qadeer Khan, admitted in 2004 to transferring nuclear secrets to North Korea, Iran and Iraq.
Pakistan tested nuclear devices in 1998, soon after India, and both nations refuse to join the NPT, which would oblige them to scrap nuclear weapons.
The first diplomat suggested that a possible way forward on Chashma was if China said that the two new reactors would be the last it claims do not need approval from the NSG.
"What in reality is needed is something that says: this is it, this is the end. And if Chashma 3 and 4 are the end, that is possibly a price worth paying," the diplomat said.
Nuclear analyst Mark Hibbs said he believed China would press ahead with its Pakistan reactor plans and that there were divisions among other NSG states on how to respond to this.
"A kind of 'don't ask, don't tell policy' ... would be very damaging for the credibility of the NSG," said Hibbs, of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

In China, Corruption and Unrest Threaten Autocratic Rule

With small protests of unsavory government acts starting to pop up in China, how much longer can the Communist Party last?
By Ben W. Heineman Jr.

In recent days, the western media separately reported two discrete stories on China -- one on corruption and a second on a social protest.
The two are, however, part of broader, interrelated trends, which together constitute significant threats to autocratic China.
Event one was an online analysis from the money laundering bureau of the People's Bank of China, the central bank, stating that 17,000 Communist Party members and state functionaries had illicitly obtained and then smuggled out of China an astonishing $124 billion from the mid-90s until 2008. These kleptocratic acts are symbolic of China's broader corruption.
Behind each separate, discrete headline on public corruption or social unrest in the daily media is this profound and long-term issue tying them together.
Event two was a riot by migrant workers in the southeastern city of Zengcheng, in Guangdong province, forcibly put down by security forces.
Migrant workers -- estimated to number at least 150 million nationally (roughly half the U.S. population) -- often protest because they lack residency rights, which are necessary for access to social benefits like education and healthcare in communities where they work.
And these migrant worker disturbances are emblematic of a rising tide of social protest by a variety of groups, which occur at the local level, but which the authorities fear could coalesce into a national movement. Even Chinese authorities estimate that the number of demonstrations is approaching 100,000 per year.
The central bank report on monumental theft of state funds by cadres and officials was completed in June, 2008, then marked confidential, but recently (and somewhat mysteriously) appeared on its website. after broad coverage in the Chinese media and a public outcry, the report was swiftly removed from site. According to the Wall Street Journal, the central bank had no comment on the report after its fleeting online appearance.
And, although the report itself discusses methods China should take to stop money laundering, it apparently does not explain how party members, officials, and officers in state enterprises obtained their outsized illicit gains.
This central bank accounting of huge party and government theft is but one type of corruption involving the Party and government which affects people and enterprises -- both Chinese and non-Chinese.
 For example, bribes are paid for procurements; judges are bribed by parties to cases; local officials take land from peasants for minimal amounts and personally profit from resale to development interests; officials misuse public funds for personal reasons (from sex to real estate to trips to investments to expatriation of funds); officials exercise "administrative discretion" in favor of those they can extort; enforcement of laws may be frustrated by pay-offs and kick-backs; and local governments may be entwined with organized crime.
Corruption, of course, is notoriously hard to measure. (Analysts look at hard statistics like investigations, prosecutions and convictions -- but these numbers may bear little relationship to underlying reality.)
For many who live and operate in China, however, it is an ever-present feature of daily life.
In a 2008 survey, Pew found that eight of 10 Chinese consider party and governmental corruption a significant issue.
This conclusion is supported by the leaders of the Chinese government itself, who for some time have recognized, at least rhetorically, that corruption is a serious threat to state order.
 Hu Jintao, China's President (and general secretary of its Communist Party), has said "Resolutely punishing and effectively preventing corruption bears on popular support for the Party and on its very survival, and is therefore a major political task the party must attend to at all times."
Others in government, again at the rhetorical level, have characterized corruption as a life or death issue for the regime.
In recent years, there have been a number of "show" trials, prosecutions, or firings of high level officials for corrupt behavior to symbolize the leaders' concern about the issue (and, in some instances, to deal with political rivals).
For example, the vice mayor of Beijing and supervisor for Olympic Construction was fired for taking bribes; the former party boss of Shanghai was sentenced to 18 years for improperly loaning hundreds of millions of dollars from a social security fund to real estate speculators; the head of the China equivalent of the FDA was executed for taking bribes and kickbacks; and the head of China's show-case high speed rail system was fired due to a corruption investigation.
In addition to sanctioning prominent officials, the national government and the Communist Party have announced anti-corruption initiatives -- they recognize that corruption not only distorts the economy, but also underlines many of the burgeoning protests. In rural areas, protests are typically linked to land confiscation, unfair land compensation, arbitrary tax burdens, and health-threatening pollution.
In urban areas, civil disturbances are frequently caused by migrant worker discrimination, unsafe working conditions, unpaid wages, or pensions and environmental issues.
In both rural and urban settings, there is a general sense of unfairness because government officials, rather than using law to protect individuals, are on the take.
They either misappropriate money themselves or receive pay-offs by powerful interests to ignore or distort the law.
Many China experts have noted that the protests arise because China does not afford citizens either open political institutions for changing power or transparent legal institutions for holding officials and businesses to account.
Chinese seeking open resolution of disputes are often thwarted and driven to the streets.
Moreover, superiors in the party or the government judge local officials by their ability to minimize civil protests, rather than by their capacity to develop legitimate political or legal outlets to address grievances. And, with political or legal institutions ineffective, the suppression of protest by corrupt officials only generates more discontent and more demonstrations.
To be sure, China is in the midst of enacting, if not enforcing, a vast array of new laws -- and of increasing the numbers of lawyers and judges with meaningful legal training. (See, for example, the website of Yale Law School's, China Law Center, or Harvard Law's China Studies site.)
China is making slow if discernible progress towards a legal system and major legal institutions that have enhanced independence and make some decisions based on law, not politics, maintains Yale's Jamie Horsley.
Yet the vast legal system (more than 3,000 courts and nearly 200,000 judges) is still plagued by lack of training, competency, and professionalism.
Moreover, Horsley herself concludes: "despite the growth of an increasingly robust legal system and broader legal consciousness in the general population, the Communist Party retains ultimate control, especially over the handling of sensitive political, economic, and social issues."
Corruption by party, state and state-enterprise officials is one of those "sensitive" areas.
Lack of local enforcement remains a major problem.
Party discipline, if and when it occurs, is often secret and undermines the legal system because it takes place outside of it.
Although authorities may use the carrot and give in to demands of some protesters, suppression by force, by abuse of "law," by harassment and intimidation and by networks of informers is the current preferred means of addressing civil protests.
It is the case especially after the tumult of the Arab Spring caused fears of destabilizing demonstrations in China. (And China is even more forceful in stamping out any protest movement which could go national.)
This repression only exacerbates the recurring problem: an absence of open and accountable political and legal institutions which would allow protests to be channeled away from the street.
Importantly, by stunting open politics and law, this approach to civil unrest fosters continued corruption in a society awash in money from investment and growth.
But this corruption -- both in the sense of officials/cadres taking money illicitly or in the arbitrary use of "law" for personal ends -- only increases, in turn, the pressure for protests.
And the great fear of the national government, of course, is that these protests will, at some point, turn into a national movement.
Meaningful steps to reduce widespread corruption will depend on transparency, accountability and rule of law, not just government anti-corruption rhetoric, the occasional sanctioning of a high official and party discipline hidden from legal view.
Thus, the recent news reports on corruption and protests noted at the beginning of this piece reflect the broader dilemma.
Can China build a meaningful system of law and legal institutions -- not just a quasi-Potemkin village of laws on the books and of lawyers and judges often controlled still by -- or ignored by -- political forces?
Or, without law, will it watch widespread corruption continue, in turn generating burgeoning protests at the local -- and perhaps national -- level?
Official corruption poses a serious threat to the ruling party.
 But so does loss of unfettered power through meaningful rule of law (in part, because so many of the 80 million party members may be implicated in some type of corruption).
How China will resolve this tension -- will try to find a balance between these two concerns -- is one of the most important questions for China's future.
Behind each separate, discrete headline on public corruption or social unrest in the daily media is this profound and long-term issue tying them together.
As a veteran Chinese communist party leader is reported to have said: "Fight corruption too little and destroy the country, fight it too much and destroy the party."

Tuesday, June 28, 2011

China’s local debt problem is bigger than it looks

By Victor Shih

How much local government debt is there in China?
On Monday, the National Audit Office (NAO) released a report, stating that local debt in China totaled some Rmb10,700bn as of year-end 2010.
Is that the new official estimate for local governmental debt?
In short, no.
Combining the findings of the NAO, the CBRC, and the PBOC in recent months, the total official estimates of local governmental debt now range between Rmb15,400bn and Rmb20,100bn.
Here is how we arrive at these numbers.
First of all, we have to understand that the National Audit Office is like the Congressional Budget Office and only cares about debt directly owed by local government organs or debt directly guaranteed by local government organs.
It does NOT care about liabilities of central and local governmental entities, which were not guaranteed by the government.
Chart 3 of the report states that the audit uncovered Rmb4,970bn in local government financing vehicle (LGFV) debt as of the end of 2010, and another Rmb5,700bn or so owed by local government organs and “business units subsidised by the budget.”
However, based on the figures previously released by the CBRC and the PBOC, we know that the Rmb4,970bn LGFV debt figure is way too low.
The discrepancy between the CBRC and PBOC estimates and the NAO number arises from the fact that the NAO was only looking for LGFV debt in which the local government has issued decrees or guarantees to underwrite.
Thus, LGFV debt which is guaranteed by another company or is collateralised by land was not part of the NAO audit.
The most important finding of the NAO report is the non-LGFV local debt of Rmb5,700bn because this is the first authoritative non-LGFV local debt number we have seen from the government in a long time.
We therefore can add the Rmb5,700bn to the LGFV numbers previously revealed by the CBRC and the PBOC.
Thus, estimates of local debt – based entirely on official numbers – range between Rmb15,400bn (Rmb9,700bn in LGFV debt plus Rmb5,700bn in non-LGFV debt) and Rmb20,100bn (Rmb14,400bn in LGFV debt plus Rmb5,700bn in non-LGFV debt).
Note that the higher figure constitutes over 50 per cent of China’s GDP in 2010.
The problem going forward is that interest payments on this staggering debt is at least Rmb1,000bn a year for the foreseeable future.
In the mean time, local governments continue to seek new financing for grand projects.
The Chinese government took important steps forward in recognising the dangerous scale of local governmental debt, but now it must have the resolve to stop local level leveraging before risks in the financial system steam out of control.
This will be a challenging, but important step for the future of the Chinese economy.

China and Vietnam: a timeline of conflict


Sailors belonging to the Vietnamese navy march during a ceremony in 2010
(CNN) -- Hanoi's embrace of one-time foe the U.S. and growing rancor with Vietnam War-era ally China may appear surprising, but the two nations share a long and complicated history of territorial disputes.
Vietnam and China, who established formal ties in 1950, have had border differences that trace back to the 1950's.
These disputes were deferred while Beijing's southern neighbor was battling a civil war, and the U.S. entry into the conflict tied Northern Vietnam more closely to Beijing.
As the Vietnam war wound down, however, territorial disputes began anew.
1973 -- Hanoi announces to Beijing its intentions to negotiate contracts with foreign firms for the exploration of oil in the Gulf of Tonkin, part of the South China Sea. The disputed islands in the South China Sea assume importance only after it is disclosed that they are near the potential sites of substantial offshore oil deposits.
January 1974 -- Chinese military units seize islands in the Paracels occupied by South Vietnamese armed forces, and Beijing claims sovereignty over the Spratlys.
Spring 1975 -- South Vietnam occupies part of the Spratly Islands.
1976 -- North and South Vietnam unify.
1978 -- Vietnam's treatment of the Hoa people - an ethnic Chinese group - becomes an issue when Hanoi institutes a crackdown on the Chinese community because of its pervasive role in domestic commerce in the South and its alleged subversive activities in the North. Vietnam's actions force an unprecedented exodus of thousands of Hoa across the border into China.
November 1978 -- Sino-Vietnam relations worsen when the Soviet Union and Vietnam sign a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation that calls for mutual assistance and consultation in the event of a security threat to either country.
February to March 1979 -- In the Sino-Vietnamese Border War, China launches the offensive in response to Vietnam's invasion and occupation of Cambodia, which ends the reign of the China-backed Khmer Rouge. This becomes China's largest military operation since the Korean War.
1985 -- Throughout most of 1985 and into the early months of 1986, Vietnam's border provinces are subject to intense artillery and mortar shelling. China issues vague threats to Vietnam of a "second lesson" over the stalemate with Cambodia.
1988 -- China and Vietnam fight a naval battle just off the Spratly Islands. 70 Vietnamese sailors are killed.
November 1991 -- China and Vietnam normalize relations after more than a decade of hostility.
December 1999 -- The two countries sign the Land Border Treaty.
December 2000 -- Vietnam and China sign two agreements to resolve a long-standing territorial dispute over the resource rich Gulf of Tonkin. The agreements demarcate territorial waters and exclusive economic zones, as well as outlining regulations for fisheries.
May 2003 -- The Vietnamese Foreign Ministry issues a "sovereignty" declaration on the Chinese ban on fishing in the South China Sea, claiming that Vietnam had undisputed "sovereignty" rights over the Paracel and Spratly islands.
May 25, 2011 -- A Vietnamese ship has its cables cut by Chinese patrol boats while conducting a underwater survey of the South China Sea.
June 9, 2011 -- Vietnam's foreign ministry says a Chinese fishing boat supported by two Chinese naval patrol craft cut a cable being used by a seismic survey craft operated by state-run energy company PetroVietnam.
June 13, 2011 -- Vietnam holds live-fire drills in the South China Sea amid high tensions with China over disputed waters.

South China Sea - Asia's most dangerous waters

By Kevin Voigt and Natalie Robehmed
Picture by the Vietnam News Agency showing live fire drills June 14 on Phan Vinh Island in the disputed Spratly Island chain
Hong Kong -- The South China Sea -- a 1.3 million square mile patch of the Pacific Ocean bracketed by China and several Southeast Asian nations -- is dotted with hundreds of largely uninhabited islands and coral atolls that are home to some of the world's most diverse marine life.
Also under its waves lie potentially huge reserves of natural gas and oil.
A Chinese estimate suggests as much as 213 billion barrels of oil lie untapped in the South China Sea which, if true, would make it the largest oil reserve outside Saudi Arabia, according to the U.S. Energy Information Administration.
That prospect has cross-stitched the sea with competing claims from China, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei.
A recent spate of incidents between Chinese and Vietnamese vessels in the sea has fueled a growing rift between the communist neighbors, creating strange bedfellows as Hanoi embraces closer military ties with historic foes in Washington.
The South China Sea has now become a petri dish for swirling changes churning the geopolitical landscape, analysts say, as the rising power of China butts up against the established economic and military might of the U.S.
"How these disputes are resolved will tell us how politics in Asia is going to play out in the next 20 to 30 years," said Mark Valencia, a fellow at the National Asia Research Program and expert on the South China Sea dispute.
"This will be the blueprint."

Why is this happening now?
The competing stakes in the South China Sea are nothing new: territorial claims to the islands stretch back decades, even centuries, according to some of the nations vying in the sea grab.
The dispute took center stage earlier this month when defense officials from 28 Asia-Pacific nations gathered at the Shangri-La hotel in Singapore.
China, for the first time, sent its top soldier to the annual meeting -- General Liang Guanglie -- who spoke at length about China's peace-loving nature and focus on cooperative development and security in the region.
His olive branch was met with skepticism, said Alan Dupont, a regional security analyst who was at the meeting.
"It was a packed hall, and there were a lot of hostile questions directed to China from (participants from) Asia and the United States," said Dupont, director of the Centre for International Security Studies at the University of Sydney.

Zakaria: Beijing's foreign policy blunders
Many questions seem to reflect a fear of growing Chinese assertiveness in the disputed waters.
In late May, the Vietnamese Ministry of Defense reported that a Chinese patrol boat slashed a submerged cable of a oil and gas survey ship operated by PetroVietnam, the state energy firm.
A similar incident happened on June 9 -- just four days after Liang's address -- when a Chinese patrol boat cut cables from a Vietnamese ship doing seismic surveys off its southern coast, Vietnam's Foreign Ministry reported.
Beijing maintains that Vietnamese vessels have been illegally surveying in Chinese waters and harassing Chinese fishing boats.

China and Vietnam: A timeline of conflict
Vietnam is not the only nation skirmishing with Chinese patrol boats.
The Philippines, on the western border of the South China Sea, also reported Chinese boats cutting cables of a survey ship and threatening to ram its boats in March, according to Manila's Foreign Ministry.
China claims both nations were exploring in disputed waters.
China says it is not to blame.
"If you want to know why there is tension in South China Sea, I think you have to go and ask the country or countries that have made all the provocations," Cui Lei, China's vice minister of the Foreign Ministry, told CNN in a rare interview last week

How much oil and gas is under the sea?
China claims there could be enough oil and gas to rival Saudi Arabia's reserves, but those claims have yet to be proven, according to a U.S. Energy Information Administration report.
Still, there are enough proven wells in the South China Sea to tantalize the players, which explains why oil and gas survey vessels are at the heart of the recent incidents.
"I think the critical reason now in the increase in tension is the rising energy insecurity in the region, particularly in China," Dupont said.
The smaller nations in the region are feeling the pressure to stake their claims for oil and fishing rights, or risk losing them to a more assertive China, analysts say.
"There's a sense coastal states like Vietnam and the Philippines need to use the economic area more urgently, so they need to catch more fish now, they need to discover more oil now," said James Manicom, an expert on maritime disputes at the Balsillie School of International Affairs in Waterloo, Canada.

Why do so many nations claim the waters?
At the heart of both disputes is a term of international maritime law known as "Exclusive Economic Zone," where nations are allowed sole rights to fish and develop resources within 200 nautical miles of a country's shores.
That has created interest in nations' grabbing uninhabited islands -- often little more than rocky atolls -- to extend their zone.
China lays the broadest claim, covering all of the Spratly Islands in the southern part of the ocean and Paracel Islands to the north -- essentially most of the South China Sea.
Vietnam also claims the entirety of both island groups, while Malaysia, Brunei and the Philippines say they own part of the Spratlys.
All but Brunei occupy some of the disputed islands with naval bases, airstrips and even resorts.
"It seems to me in East Asian states that if you act like you own a piece of a claim, you do -- possession is nine-tenths of the law," Manicom said.
There is plenty of oil being produced along the undisputed coastal areas of the South China Sea -- Brunei, Malaysia and Vietnam are all net oil exporters while China also produces a chunk of its offshore oil from the South China Sea, said Kang Wu, an energy expert at the East-West Center in Honolulu.
"If they want further develop production and reduce the decline of aging oil fields, a move into deeper water for drilling has become important for every country involved," Wu said.

What's the U.S. stake in this?
Last week the U.S. -- which has a defense treaty with the Philippines -- agreed to help modernize Manila's military during a Washington visit by Foreign Secretary Albert del Rosario.
"While we are a small country, we are prepared to do what is necessary to stand up to any aggressive action in our backyard," del Rosario said at a press conference with U.S. Secretary of State Hilary Clinton.
The United States waded into the water dispute a year ago when Clinton attended the annual defense meeting at the Shangri-La in Singapore.
Clinton rattled Beijing when she offered to mediate the dispute and suggested a peaceful outcome was in U.S. national interests.
At the time, Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi called Clinton's comments "an attack on China."
Washington changed tack last year after a high-level defense meeting in which Beijing told the U.S. that the South China Sea was a "core security concern for China," Dupont said.
"Previously only Tibet, Xinjiang and Taiwan were mentioned as a 'core security concern'."
Beijing considers Taiwan a renegade province and struggles with separatists movements in Tibet and Xinjiang, so having the South China Sea mentioned in the same breath "really raised alarm bells in Washington, and brought Clinton to Singapore," Dupont said.
The shipping lanes of the South China Sea are among the busiest in the world and a vital lifeline for China's growing hunger for commodities such as oil, natural gas and iron ore.
To hedge against a more assertive China, Southeast Asian nations are turning to Washington.
Vietnam and the U.S. have announced a new round of joint military exercises, and the U.S. recently held joint drills with the Philippines.
"There have been rapid defense engagements (with the U.S.) in the past 12 months," Dupont said.
"The Philippines is welcoming the U.S. back after kicking them out of their naval bases a few years back."
"This is an opportunity for the U.S. to get back in Asia in a big way," Manicom added.

Who's the bad guy here?
General Liang's charm offensive in Singapore earlier this month -- and a similar trip to the Philippines after the March incident with a Filipino vessel -- shows Beijing's concern about rising tensions in the region, analysts say.
But several cautioned that blaming China would be a misinterpretation of the forces at work in the South China Sea.
Nations liberally interpret maritime treaties to their own advantage, experts said.
"There is a sense of sanctimoniousness on all sides," said Valencia.
He points out the U.S. regularly cites the UN Convention on Law of the Sea -- which allows free navigation of seas within the 200-nautical mile "Exclusive Economic Zones" at the heart of the South China Sea debate. Yet the U.S. has never actually ratified the treaty.
In recent disputes with Vietnam and the Philippines, "China says it was not the one who made the first move," Wu said.
"China claims that these other countries went deeper into disputed areas. The reaction from China is believed to be firmer than in the past."
China's Foreign Vice Minister Cui told CNN: "China has done everything possible to maintain stability in the region, and we always believe that any disputes, any possible disputes over territory, over the water in the South China Sea, should be resolved through bilateral negotiations and dialogue," Cui said.
While China wants to iron out territorial disputes individually with each country involved, its neighbors have other ideas.
"The Southeast Asian nations are now starting to get together and talk about common approaches to China, which is the last thing Beijing wants," Dupont said.
The growing rift has eroded much of the goodwill China has built with its neighbors as all economies in the region benefited from Beijing's rise in financial clout, overtaking Japan last year as the world's second wealthiest nation, analysts say.
"China is looking like the bad guy," Manicom said.
"That perception is a problem."


Why are the stakes rising?
The fear on all sides is that the rising tenor of the South China Sea debate, coupled with increased U.S. military involvement, is creating a 21st Century Cold War in Southeast Asia.
Tensions over a similar perennial dispute between China and Japan regarding a group of islands in the East China Sea boiled over last year when Japan arrested the crew of a Chinese sailing vessel, sparking nationalist demonstrations in both countries and a war of words at the highest levels between Tokyo and Beijing.
Similar demonstrations recently erupted in Vietnam over territorial claims in the South China Sea, and computer hackers from both sides have attacked websites in the opposing country, posting nationalistic images and messages, according to Chinese media reports.
On Saturday Vietnamese and Chinese officials met and promised a peaceful resolution to the water dispute, according to China's Foreign Ministry.
Yet on Sunday protesters gathered outside the Chinese embassy in Hanoi for the fourth consecutive week of demonstrations, according to local media reports.


Rivals push to rename the South China Sea
There is increasing concern that nationalist sentiment could force nations to adopt a more belligerent tone both on the seas and in negotiations.
"The big fear here is not that any of the countries want to have a conflict... but as these tensions go up, countries get pushed into a position domestically that causes them to take a harder line," Dupont said.
"The big concern is miscalculation, misunderstanding and misperception.
"We just came out of probably the most peaceful 25 years Asia has ever seen," Dupont added.
"We're at a tipping point here at the moment and the next 12 or 18 months could be very important."

South China Sea disputes could lead to war in Asia

CANBERRA (Reuters) -- Risks are growing that incidents at sea involving China could lead to war in Asia, an Australian policy think tank warned on Tuesday.
Concentrated on the South and East China seas, the risk-taking behavior of the Chinese military, resource needs, and greater assertiveness, raised the possibility of armed conflict that could draw in the United States and other powers, the Lowy Institute said in a report.
"The sea lanes of Indo-Pacific Asia are becoming more crowded, contested and vulnerable to armed strife. Naval and air forces are being strengthened amid shifting balances of economic strategic weight," report authors Rory Medcalf and Raoul Heinrichs wrote.
"China's frictions with the United States, Japan and India are likely to persist and intensify. As the number and tempo of incidents increases, so does the likelihood that an episode will escalate to armed confrontation, diplomatic crisis or possibly even conflict," the report said.
The study on major powers and maritime security in Indo-Pacific Asia was published as China prepares to unveil its first aircraft carrier, perhaps this week, a development has caused worries in the region about China's ongoing military expansion.
Earlier this month, China sent its biggest civilian patrol ship to the South China Sea.
That rattled the Philippines, which makes competing claims to some waters thought to hold vast oil and gas reserves.
On Monday, the U.S. Senate passed a resolution that deplored China's use of force against Vietnamese and Philippine ships in South China Sea.
"DANGER ZONE"
Medcalf and Heinrichs said more maritime patrols and intrusive surveillance, coupled with nationalism and resources disputes, all make it harder to manage arguments over maritime sovereignty.
"All of these factors are making Asia a danger zone for incidents at sea: close-range encounters involving vessels and aircraft from competing powers, typically in sensitive or contested zones," the report said.
The report detailed tensions between China and Japan, stemming from the April 2010 Chinese naval exercise near Japan's southern Okinawa islands, followed by Japan's arrest of a Chinese fisherman, whose trawler rammed a Japanese coastguard vessel.
Those incidents provoked a diplomatic crisis and saw China cut its exports of crucial rare earth minerals to Japan.
Despite initial signs of warmer bilateral ties following the March tsunami and nuclear crisis in Japan, security relations remain tense after Japan a month earlier scrambled fighter jets when Chinese surveillance planes approached disputed islands.
"Helicopter buzzing incidents have continued, with Japan deploring as especially insensitive an instance that occurred in the weeks following the March disaster," the report said.
It said Beijing has caused concern in other Southeast Asian nations over its "core interest" claim on the South China Sea, and in Australia about China's possible future security behavior, while there was widespread speculation that competition between India and China at sea was "only a matter of time."
Medcalf and Heinrichs said new efforts were needed to build regional confidence and to involve China in a continued military dialogue with the United States and Japan.
They also said maritime security hotlines were needed between the U.S. and China, and Japan and China, to allow real-time responses to any incidents.

Life Behind the Great Firewall of China


China's restrictions on Internet access are sometimes subtler than you expect… unless you want to access Google, Twitter, or Facebook.
By Sascha Segan
HONG KONG—Here in Hong Kong, the Internet is global.
But just over the border in the Chinese boom town of Shenzhen, major international websites get shut down behind the famed "Great Firewall of China."
Watching the vibrant economic ferment in Shenzhen, it's hard to remember that you're in a totalitarian state. The Chinese folks I encountered were generally pretty blase about politics.
Then again, Shenzhen is one of the richest cities in China, and the people I spoke to came from the relatively well-off professional classes.
So it was shocking to pull up a chair at Coco Park—a shopping mall in Shenzhen that's so expensive that I couldn't afford most of the things sold there—and be unable to access my Facebook page.
Here in Hong Kong, Facebook is everywhere: ads on the subway regularly include companies' Facebook fan pages.
Just next door in Shenzhen, Facebook is silent.
China's firewall (which is really called the "Golden Shield") is more subtle than you might imagine at first glance.
I didn't have trouble accessing English-language news sites that were critical of the Chinese government—for instance, a BBC article about artist Ai Weiwei being freed from jail, or various articles about the Taiwanese presidential elections.
News sites tend to become blocked or unblocked around major news events, according to frequent reports.
Some foreign-based social networking sites such as Facebook, Twitter, and Foursquare are blocked.
This doesn't seem to be merely about preventing Chinese people from discussing controversial topics.
It's also a way to nurture Chinese alternatives which both feed the Chinese economy and which the government can control, as the Telegraph explains.
For instance, Sina Weibo is basically the Chinese Twitter.
MySpace is fast, easy, and permitted, but nobody seems to use it.
MySpace owner Rupert Murdoch bent over backwards to make his global site into a "local" Chinese Internet property, but it's widely considered a failure when put up against other social-networking sites that are actually Chinese.
China's relationship with Google is very uneasy.
Google isn't blocked—not exactly.
But access to Google services is hideously slow, to the point where you wouldn't want to use them.
Various phrases also get blocked in Web searches.
The government hates the meditation/exercise group Falun Gong, for instance.
When I searched for "Falun Gong," not only did my computer return no results, it actually shut down my access to Google for about ten minutes.
The Great Firewall has plenty of holes.
Smart Chinese netizens tend to use proxy servers or VPNs to get around restrictions.
Aforementioned artist Ai Weiwei has more than 89,000 Twitter followers.
The government shuts down access to various proxies from time to time, but it's clear the firewall is about making certain choices inconvenient rather than totally inaccessible.
The government has also allowed some businesses to use the unrestricted Internet; at the JW Marriott, my hotel in Shenzhen, the Internet was routed through Hong Kong.
This week, Engadget reported an office park in Chongqing is getting the full-scale Net as well.

US Senate deplores China action in South China Sea

AFP | Jun 28, 2011
WASHINGTON: The US Senate on Monday unanimously approved a resolution that "deplores the use of force" by Chinese vessels in territorial disputes in the strategic and resource-rich South China Sea.
Tensions there have escalated in recent weeks, with the Philippines and Vietnam alarmed at what they say are increasingly aggressive actions by Beijing in disputed waters.
The symbolic resolution "deplores the use of force by naval and maritime security vessels from China in the South China Sea" and urges a "multilateral, peaceful process to resolve these disputes."
China has in the past rejected calls for multilateral talks on the South China Sea disputes, insisting on one-on-one contacts with other claimants.
The senate measure also "supports the continuation of operations by the United States Armed Forces in support of freedom of navigation rights in international waters and air space in the South China Sea."
Lawmakers reaffirmed "strong support" for the "peaceful resolution" of maritime territorial disputes there and urges all party to the feuds to "refrain from threatening force or using force to assert territorial claims."
Several recent incidents have put the security spotlight on the South China Sea, a strategic and potentially oil-rich area where China has sometimes overlapping disputes with Vietnam, the Philippines, Brunei and Malaysia
Recently, Vietnam carried out live-fire drills and the Philippines ordered the deployment of its naval flagship after accusing China of aggressive actions.
The United States on Saturday called for China to lower tensions through dialogue as they held talks on frictions in Southeast Asia.
Senior US official Kurt Campbell said he assured China during the talks in Hawaii that the United States welcomed a strong role for Beijing, which has warned Washington against involvement in the intensifying disputes.
"We want tensions to subside. We have a strong interest in the maintenance in peace and stability, and we are seeking a dialogue among all of the key players," said Campbell, assistant secretary of state of East Asian and Pacific affairs.

China rebukes Cameron for pointing the finger over human rights abuses

By Patrick Wintour

The Chinese premier, Wen Jiabao, issued a diplomatic dressing down of the British government by declaring the UK should stop "finger pointing" over human rights in discussions with Beijing.
Wen also suggested the UK economy needed to do better, in remarks that appeared to differ from his warm words towards Germany, which he was also visiting on his European tour.
The rebukes marred the signing of some £1.4bn of trade deals, the most important being an agreement between BG, the UK energy group, and Bank of China for up to $1.5bn of funding to expand projects in China.
Britain, for its part, said it would welcome Chinese investment in UK infrastructure, as well as greater co-operation over international development.
At a Downing Street press conference, Wen repeatedly aired his frustration at the way the UK government and media seemed to obsess about human rights.
He said: "On human rights, China and the UK should respect each other, respect the facts, treat each other as equals, engage in more co-operation than finger-pointing and resolve our differences through dialogue. China is not only pursuing economic development but also political structural reform and improvement in democracy and the rule of law."
He said China had been exposed to untold "sufferings" in its 2,000-year history.
David Cameron said: "We applaud the economic transformation that has taken place in China… But, as I said in Beijing last November, we do believe the best guarantor of prosperity and stability is for economic and political progress to go in step together."
The prime minister said no issue had been left off the table but No 10 was reluctant to detail specific human rights abuses.
He said: "There is no trade-off in our relationship. It is not about either discussing trade or human rights. Britain and China have such a strong and developed relationship. We have a dialogue that covers all these issues, and nothing is off limits in the discussions that we have."
Wen did say there was "no strategic conflict" between the UK and China and that "our common interests outweigh our differences".
It was a mark of this relationship that China would be sending two giant pandas, Tian Tian and Yangguang, to Edinburgh Zoo by the end of this year – as announced by China's vice premier, Li Keqiang, in January.
Cameron also pressed China to crackdown on abuses of intellectual property and patents, saying it was "absolutely essential" because of Britain's strength in branded goods and in film, music and the arts.
A "symposium" to discuss the issue has been set up.
Chinese officials, involved in a month-long crackdown on civil rights activists, expressed irritation and said Britain was viewed less favourably in Beijing than Germany, France, Italy and Spain.
There is anger that Cameron has gone further than other timid European leaders when in China in raising human rights concerns.
In a speech to the Royal Society, Wen admitted corruption and income disparities were harming people's lives in China.
"To be frank, corruption, unfair income distribution and other ills that harm the people's interests still exist in China."
Wen also expressed his differences with the British over Libya saying the solution lay in diplomacy.
"Foreign troops may be able to win war in a place, but they can hardly win peace. Hard lessons have been learned from what has happened in the Middle East and Afghanistan."
China still supported the UN security council resolution that authorised air strikes to protect civilians, but the nations involved must comply with the strict terms.
Wen added: "We hope that the issue of Libya will be resolved through political, peaceful means, to reduce the humanitarian harm and in particular the harm of innocent civilians."

False European hopes of a Chinese saviour

By Jonathan Holslag

With Premier Wen Jiabao winding up another charity trip, European political and business leaders are going all-out to curry favour with the cash-laden Chinese juggernaut.
Yet hopes that Mr Wen’s rising power will drag their region out of its economic malaise actually threaten to wreck an already complicated relationship.
Europe’s interest in building a new “silk road” to the thriving Chinese market is not new, but the recent financial crisis added new impetus.
Appeals have been made to China, to help bail out Greece, Portugal and Spain by purchasing their debt.
With home markets subdued, European states are also scrambling to serve the burgeoning Chinese consumer market.
Visiting investors are routinely given the red-carpet treatment, as if the vanguard of a new caravan of capital bearers.
This is obviously not a trivial matter.
Chinese direct investment in the European Union has now expanded to $6bn a year, according to government figures, while Beijing has pledged many billions more to the treasuries of peripheral nations.
Yet these achievements must also be put in perspective.
China’s share of EU investment inflows remains relatively modest, and compared to its $1,000bn in US Treasury bond holdings, Chinese purchases of European debt are still tiny.
Such figures, however, hide the crux of the problem.
Europe’s economy is now sufficiently damaged that China alone can never do enough to help it recover.
To put it bluntly, why should we expect Chinese companies to create jobs in Europe when our own ones stumble under the weight of high wages and taxes?
And why should we expect our exports to grow when so many European industries prefer to build products in China?
Europe’s task is to maintain its current level of development, even while it lacks the productive machinery needed for that task.
This has long been a challenge for those southern European member states seeking to emulate the prosperity of the north.
The financial crisis high-­lighted only that the high welfare standards of the north were also built on shaky fundamentals too.
European politicians are not keen on further austerity measures, so they are now calling (once again) for reforms to help boost the efficiency of the continent’s services sector and its overall innovation capacity.
Yet even if this works, such things will scarcely reduce Europe’s growing current account deficit, especially with China.
In 2010 Europe’s $4bn services surplus with China was dwarfed by a $203bn deficit in goods – the explanation for its current account deficit of $190bn.
Only greater industrial capacity can maintain current living standards.
And it is here that China comes again to the forefront – but as a challenger, not a potential saviour.
China boasts wages still 5 to 10 times below the European average, improving infrastructure and education, vast budgets for research, and, above all, a seemingly endless ambition to build world-class industries.
When Chinese companies do invest in Europe, they are seeking knowhow, and export channels.
China’s desire to put its workers first is not an offence.
Yet when a new generation of European politicians begins to scrutinise the balance sheet of greater economic co-operation, they will soon find ample arguments to stop Chinese companies taking over or outbidding their last few industrial strongholds.
China is practising an increasingly sophisticated form of economic nationalism, while there are obvious flaws of reciprocity in the access China and Europe provide to each other’s market.
It would not be difficult for Europe to find reasons to defend its industries, even if this meant an end to prudent policies at the European Commission.
In the long term, we should, therefore, expect the silk road to take a nasty turn, one that could well make it impossible to maintain stable relations between the two poles of the Eurasian continent.
Yet such a turn would, in the first place, be symptomatic for Europe’s own failure to adjust to changing economic realities.
Europe’s bureaucratic elites might be long-socialised to believe the benefits of free trade, but its future political leaders will need to confront new realities that respond to the changing confidence of their societies – a confidence that ultimately reflects shifts in the global balance of power.
When this happens, Mr Wen’s successors will find Europe’s welcome to be far less warm.

Monday, June 27, 2011

Freed China critic says wants to resume activism


By Robert Saiget


BEIJING — Prominent Chinese dissident Hu Jia wants to resume his activism but he is weighing up the impact on his family, according to his first reported comments since being released from prison at the weekend.
During a phone interview with Hong Kong's Cable TV, Hu stressed the importance of "loyalty to morality, loyalty to the rights of citizens".
"You should be loyal to your conscience," he said in a broadcast aired late Sunday.
One of China's leading rights activists and government critics, Hu returned to his Beijing home early on Sunday, his wife Zeng Jinyan said on Twitter, after completing a more than three-year sentence for subversion.
Hu's release came just days after outspoken artist Ai Weiwei returned to his home in the Chinese capital after nearly three months in police custody, amid a government crackdown on dissent.
Hu, 37, was jailed in April 2008, just months before the Beijing Olympics, after angering the ruling Communist Party through years of bold campaigning for civil rights, the environment and AIDS patients.
He won the Sakharov Prize, the European Parliament's highest human rights honour, later that year while in prison.
Hu now faces one year of "deprivation of political rights" -- essentially a ban on political activities that typically includes not talking to media.




Hu returned to his Beijing home after completing a more than three-year sentence for subversion 
Chinese police have blocked access to his home, which indicates he will face restrictions on his movements and contacts.
Hu said in the phone interview that his family was pressuring him to stay out of trouble.
"They have told me: 'Live an ordinary life and don't clash with the regime because this regime is very cruel and it arbitrarily violates the dignity of its citizens'," Hu said.
"I must try to console my parents and do what I can to console them... but I can only tell them I'll be careful," he added, in a strong indication he would like to return to activism.
Hu is widely expected to be hit with the same strict curbs as those apparently applied to Ai and a range of other activists and rights lawyers, who seem to have been ordered to keep quiet after their release from custody.
On her Twitter page Monday, Zeng said well-wishers hoping to visit Hu would not be allowed in, apparently referring to the police surrounding their apartment.
"Everyone, you don't want to come visit us, you won't be able to get in. We will meet again later if we have the chance," she said.
"I'm slowly reintroducing him into society and arranging his life and work. I don't think it is necessary to say anything more."
Later Zeng posted online links to Chinese regulations that spell out numerous restrictions on those who have been stripped of their "political rights" -- which is what Hu faces.
The rules allow authorities widespread powers to supervise and monitor those affected, or assign neighbourhood and residential committees to keep them under check.
"Please refer to my Twitter accounts," Zeng said in an email to AFP, refusing to comment on Hu's legal standing with authorities.
According to the Hong Kong-based Chinese Human Rights Defenders (CHRD), police have placed numerous activists under surveillance and warned them not to visit Hu.
An editorial in Monday's English-language official Global Times, which is published for foreign consumption, complained that the support Hu enjoys in the West was linked to a Western bias toward China's communist government.
"Hu and other people win Western applause not because of what they have done for Chinese society and world peace, but simply because they are anti-Chinese government," the editorial said, in the only mention of Hu in state media.
"Mr. Hu had better keep a sober mind in the face of Western praise, just as China should keep its eye on the various comments coming from the West."